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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Jerome Holloway is a mentally retarded man in Georgia accused of robbery and 
murder.1  With an I.Q. of forty-nine, Holloway’s mental age is that of a seven year 
old.2  Holloway cannot tell time, does not know what country he lives in, and cannot 
recite the alphabet.3  Holloway’s attorney described him as a man who is “poor and 
illiterate and totally without the mental facilities to understand the fate which 
awaited him.”4  Nonetheless, Holloway confessed to the crimes, although he could 
not even read his statement.5  Holloway was sentenced to death.6  On appeal, 
                                                                
1 Human Rights Watch, Beyond Reason: The Death Penalty and Offenders with Mental 
Retardation, 13 HUM. RTS. WATCH 1(G) (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 
2001/ustat.  
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Joe Parham, Condemned Man Called ‘Most Retarded Man on Death Row,’ UNITED 
PRESS INT’L, Oct. 12, 1987, Monday, PM Cycle, Domestic News. 
5 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1. 
6 Id. 
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Holloway’s lawyers demonstrated Holloway’s lack of comprehension by asking 
whether he assassinated Presidents Lincoln, Kennedy, and Reagan.7  Holloway 
replied that he assassinated all three.8  Holloway was described as “the most retarded 
man on death row anywhere in the nation.”9  Just hours before his scheduled 
execution, the Georgia Supreme Court overturned Holloway’s sentence due to his 
lack of mental capacity.10 
Earl Washington is a mentally retarded man from Virginia with an I.Q. between 
fifty-seven and sixty-nine.11  Washington, who has a mental age of ten, “knows 
‘some,’ but not all, of the letters of the alphabet.”12  In 1983, Washington was 
arrested for a minor assault.13  During his interrogation, Washington confessed to 
various other crimes, including a 1982 rape and murder.14  Despite concluding that 
most of Washington’s confessions were false, the State prosecuted Washington and 
sentenced him to death.15  Great weight was given to Washington’s confessions.16  
Washington was later exonerated by DNA tests and pardoned in 2000.17   
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia held 
unconstitutional the execution of mentally retarded individuals.18  The Court did not, 
however, set forth a definition of mental retardation or a procedural standard by 
which mental retardation would be decided.19  The result is a plethora of procedures 
and definitions that differ from state to state.20  Ohio and Georgia are two states with 
vastly different procedures for determining mental retardation.  These different 
procedures may lead to an arbitrary application of Atkins, which “arguably violates” 
Furman v. Georgia.21  
                                                                
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Parham, supra note 4. 
10 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id; see also Washington v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 577 (Va. 1984). 
15 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).   
19 Id. at 317.  The Court’s decision to leave to the states the task of developing a 
procedural standard has recently been reaffirmed.  See Schriro v. Smith, No. 04-1475, 2005 
U.S. LEXIS 7652 (Oct. 17, 2005). 
20 See, e.g., State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011 (Ohio 2002) (setting forth procedural 
framework in Ohio for determining mental retardation); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2005) 
(setting forth procedural framework in Georgia for determining mental retardation).   
21 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 
(1976) (“Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be 
imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss3/8
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First, Ohio and Georgia have adopted different burdens of proof for establishing 
mental retardation.22  Like Ohio, the majority of states require that mental retardation 
be established by a preponderance of the evidence.23  By contrast, Georgia is the only 
state that requires defendants to prove mental retardation beyond a reasonable 
doubt.24  Georgia’s higher standard of proof causes several problems.  For example, 
Georgia’s burden of proving mental retardation is inconsistent with its burden of 
proving affirmative defenses.25  Also, the mentally retarded defendant’s reduced 
mental capacity justifies a lower standard of proof.26  Further, an individual alleging 
mental retardation may have better success prevailing in Ohio on his or her claim 
than in Georgia.27  Such a result is unacceptable because it may result in an arbitrary 
application of Atkins.   
Second, while Ohio requires the judge to make the mental retardation 
determination,28 Georgia requires the jury to decide the issue.29  If a jury is biased 
toward a mentally retarded defendant it does not understand, then allowing that jury 
to make the retardation determination is inappropriate.30  It is more appropriate to 
require the judge, who has more experience making impartial decisions, to determine 
mental retardation.31  Ohio and Georgia have each adopted a definition of mental 
                                                           
in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”); see also Cynthia Orpen, Following in the Footsteps 
of Ford: Mental Retardation and Capital Punishment Post-Aktins, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 88 
(2003) (arguing that the failure of the Supreme Court to set a uniform state standard for 
determining insanity and mental retardation leads to an arbitrary application of capital 
sentences, which “arguably violates Furman”). 
22 Compare Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1015 (requiring capital defendants prove mental 
retardation by a “preponderance of the evidence”), with GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3) 
(2005) (requiring capital defendants prove mental retardation “beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
23 Orpen, supra note 21, at 96. 
24 Id. at 96-97. 
25 See Amanda Raines, Note, Prohibiting the Execution of the Mentally Retarded, 53 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 171, 198 (2002) (arguing the role of mental retardation will “change from 
being a mitigating factor to being akin to an affirmative defense”). 
26 Jonathan L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded from Capital Punishment: State 
Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
59, 135 (1996). 
27 See Orpen, supra note 21, at 95 (arguing the lack of definite procedural standard for use 
in determining mental retardation for Atkins purposes leads to an “arbitrary and inconsistent 
application of Atkins”). 
28 State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002) 
29 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (2005).   
30 See, e.g., Bing, supra note 26, at 86 (“Juries may actually interpret mental retardation as 
an aggravating, rather than a mitigating, factor in the decision of whether to impose capital 
punishment.”); Rebecca Dick-Hurwitz, Penry v. Lynaugh: The Supreme Court Deals a Fatal 
Blow to Mentally Retarded Capital Defendants, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 699, 723 (1990) (arguing 
that a jury may see mental retardation as something that may make the defendant more 
dangerous).  
31 As discussed below, judges are trained to be impartial.  See infra notes 200-05 and 
accompanying text. 
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retardation similar to those adopted by the American Psychiatric Association and the 
American Association on Mental Retardation.32  These definitions can help serve as a 
guide for a national legal definition of mental retardation. 
This Note compares Ohio’s and Georgia’s post-Atkins frameworks for 
determining mental retardation.  Ohio’s framework offers a fairer application of 
Atkins and should serve as a guide for a national legal standard for use by state trial 
courts to determine mental retardation.  Specifically, Ohio’s use of preponderance of 
the evidence is a more appropriate standard of proof for determining mental 
retardation because it better reaches the overall goal in Atkins.33  Allowing the judge 
to make the mental retardation determination protects the alleged mentally retarded 
defendant from potential jury bias.34  Because Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions of 
mental retardation are substantially similar and mirror medical definitions of mental 
retardation, either definition can be adopted as the national standard.35 The 
procedures adopted by Ohio, however, weigh heavily in favor of their incorporation 
into a national standard.  Finally, although Ohio provides a better procedural 
framework, the nature of mental retardation requires implementation of training 
programs to protect mentally retarded persons accused of crimes.36  
Part II of this Note discusses the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Atkins v. Virginia.  Part III discusses Ohio’s framework for determining mental 
retardation.  Part IV discusses Georgia’s framework for determining mental 
retardation.  Part V discusses Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions of mental retardation, 
and compares these definitions to each other and to definitions propounded by 
medical organizations.  Part VI compares Georgia’s “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard of proof with Ohio’s “preponderance of the evidence” standard and 
concludes: Ohio’s “preponderance” standard is more appropriate for determining 
mental retardation because it will best follow the purpose of Atkins.  Part VII 
evaluates the potential for jury bias when the jury determines mental retardation. 
Ohio’s requirement that the judge determine whether the defendant is mentally 
retarded for Atkins purposes ensures the defendant receives the protections Atkins 
intended to guarantee.  Part VIII explains how the different procedures adopted by 
Ohio and Georgia may lead to an arbitrary application of Atkins, and therefore 
recommends a uniform procedure be adopted to serve as a guide for all states 
implementing the death penalty.  Finally, part IX of this paper provides some 
recommendations for training procedures in Ohio and Georgia to ensure alleged 
mentally retarded capital defendants receive Atkins protections from the day they are 
                                                                
32 See infra notes 92-110 and accompanying text; see also Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1014 
(defining mental retardation for Atkins purposes); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (2005) 
(same); AMERICAN ASS’N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, 
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORT 5 (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter AAMR]; AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th 
rev. ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. 
33 See infra notes 141-92 and accompanying text.   
34 See infra notes 193-239 and accompanying text.   
35 See infra notes 91-140 and accompanying text.   
36 See infra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.   
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implicated in a crime and are protected against procedural bias resulting from their 
handicap.   
II.  THE ATKINS DECISION 
In Atkins, a Virginia state court convicted defendant Daryl Atkins of abduction, 
capital murder, and armed robbery.37  He was sentenced to death.38  Atkins, along 
with William Jones, abducted, robbed, and killed Eric Nesbitt.39  At trial, Jones and 
Atkins each testified the other shot and killed Nesbitt.40  Jones’s testimony was “both 
more coherent and credible than Atkins’[sic]” and was “obviously credited by the 
jury and was sufficient to establish Atkins’[sic] guilt.”41  As a result, the State was 
able to prove two aggravating circumstances against Atkins: Future dangerousness 
and “vileness of the offense.”42   
At the penalty phase of his trial, Atkins introduced mitigating evidence from a 
forensic psychologist who testified that Atkins was “mildly mentally retarded.”43  
The psychologist based his conclusion on interviews with people acquainted with 
Atkins, a standard intelligence test that indicated he had an I.Q. of fifty-nine, and a 
review of his court and school records.44  The State sought to overcome Atkins’ 
mitigating evidence by presenting testimony from a witness who opined Atkins was 
of “average intelligence, at least.”45  The State prevailed at its sentencing 
recommendation and the Virginia jury sentenced him to death.46   
Atkins appealed his sentence to the Virginia Supreme Court, arguing that he was 
mentally retarded and, accordingly, could not be sentenced to death.47  The court 
rejected Atkins’s claim and upheld the death sentence, refusing to reduce the 
sentence based on his I.Q. score alone, relying principally on the United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in Penry v. Lynaugh.48  The Penry Court held the Eighth 
Amendment does not preclude the execution of individuals solely on the basis of 
mental retardation.49  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Atkins to 
                                                                
37 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002). 
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 Id.  Jones did not receive the death penalty because of a deal struck with the prosecution 
that permitted him to plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for testimony against 
Atkins.  Id. at 307 n.1. 
42 Id. at 308. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 308-09. 
45 Id. at 309. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 310. 
48 Id.; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
49 Penry, 492 U.S. at 340. 
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revisit the issue of whether the execution of mentally retarded individuals violates 
the Eighth Amendment.50 
Following the Court’s decision in Penry, state legislatures began to prohibit the 
execution of the mentally retarded.51  This growing “national consensus”52 against 
executing mentally retarded individuals “provides powerful evidence [to the Court] 
that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less 
culpable than the average criminal.”53  Also, the execution of the mentally retarded 
does not further any social purposes served by the death penalty.54  Specifically, the 
Atkins Court acknowledged the death penalty serves both a retributive and a 
deterrent purpose.55  The retributive purpose, however, is not served by executing 
mentally retarded individuals because “[i]f culpability of the average murderer is 
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser 
culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of 
retribution.”56  Likewise, the execution of mentally retarded individuals does not 
deter others from committing aggravated murder because “[e]xempting the mentally 
retarded from [the death penalty] will not affect the ‘cold calculus that precedes the 
decision’ of other potential murderers.”57  Thus, the Atkins Court concluded that the 
execution of mentally retarded individuals constitutes excessive punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment, holding that “the Constitution ‘places a 
substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded 
offender.”58 
Although the Atkins Court prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded, it 
did not set forth a procedural standard for determining mental retardation.59  Instead, 
the Court left to the states the task of developing appropriate ways to prohibit the 
execution of the mentally retarded.60  Similarly, the Court did not develop a 
definition of mental retardation to guide the states, but instead merely cited several 
clinical definitions in the footnotes of its opinion.61  This action is questionable 
because, although the Atkins Court noted the difficulties in “determining which 
                                                                
50 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.  Excessive punishments under the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution are judged by currently prevailing standards.  Id. at 311 (citing U.S. 
CONST. amend. VIII). 
51 Id. at 314-15.   
52 Id. at 316. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 319.   
55 Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).  
56 Id.  
57 Id. (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186). 
58 Id. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)). 
59 Id. at 317. 
60 Id. at 317 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405, 416-17).  
61 Id. at 308 n.3. 
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offenders are in fact retarded,”62 it declined to set forth any standards to determine 
mental retardation.63  “The Court noted that the only major disagreement regarding 
the execution of mentally retarded persons, developing a method to determine 
retardation, was to be left to the states.”64  This lack of standard created a variety of 
different procedures in virtually all states that maintain the death penalty.65  In fact, 
“[i]n many cases, especially those involving borderline mental retardation, the 
defendant’s fate will depend, in large part, on the state in which his [or her] trial is 
held.”66  These different procedures risk denying Eighth Amendment protections to 
the approximately 360 mentally retarded death row inmates in the United States.67  
Two such states, Ohio and Georgia, have vastly different schemes for determining 
mental retardation.  These two schemes demonstrate the uncertainty left to the states 
by, and the inconsistency resulting from, the Court’s decision in Atkins.  
III.  OHIO’S PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING MENTAL RETARDATION 
Ohio did not prohibit the execution of mentally retarded individuals until after 
Atkins v. Virginia.68  In State v. Lott, the Ohio Supreme Court promulgated a 
standard for use by trial courts in determining when a capital defendant is mentally 
retarded and thus cannot be executed pursuant to Atkins.69  Defendant Gregory Lott 
was convicted of aggravated murder and was sentenced to death.70  On appeal to the 
Ohio Supreme Court, Lott moved to vacate his death sentence, alleging he was 
mentally retarded.71  After setting forth the standard for hearing Atkins claims, the 
                                                                
62 Id. at 317. 
63 Orpen, supra note 21, at 86-87. 
64 Tiffany A. Mann, Note, The Supreme Court Exempts Another Class from the Death 
Penalty: Mentally Retarded Offenders – Atkins v. Virginia, 4 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 77, 89 
(2003). 
65See Orpen, supra note 21, at 96 (citing state statutes that prohibit the execution of the 
mentally retarded); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(G) (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-4-618(C) (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1102 (2005); CONN GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 53a-46a(h)(2) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(2) (West 2005); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (2005);  IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-6 (West 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4623(d) (2005); KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.140 (LexisNexis 2004); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW § 2-202(b)(2)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4)(1) (West 2005); NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-105.01(2) (LexisNexis 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1(B) 
(LexisNexis 2005); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12)(c) (Consol. 2005); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 23A-27A-26.3 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(b) (2005); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 10.95.030(2) (West 2005); Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011. 
66 Orpen, supra note 21, at 102. 
67 Mann, supra note 64, at 93; Orpen, supra note 21, at 83-84; 
68 State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1011 (Ohio 2002).  
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1013. 
71  Id.  
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court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Lott was mentally 
retarded.72 
For Atkins purposes, a capital defendant in Ohio is mentally retarded when he or 
she has: “(1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, (2) significant 
limitations in two or more adaptive skills, such as communication, self-care, and 
self-direction, and (3) onset [of mental retardation] before the age of 18.”73  There is 
a rebuttable presumption that a defendant is not mentally retarded if his or her I.Q. is 
above seventy.74   
Ohio’s procedure for determining mental retardation requires capital defendants 
currently awaiting trial to raise mental retardation prior to trial.75   In Ohio, it is the 
trial judge rather than the jury who reviews the evidence and determines whether the 
defendant is mentally retarded.76  The trial judge must determine whether the 
defendant proved his or her mental retardation by a “preponderance of the 
evidence.”77  Ohio also permits those defendants already sentenced to death to file 
within 180 days of the Lott opinion a petition for post-conviction relief raising an 
Atkins claim.78  
IV.  GEORGIA’S PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING MENTAL RETARDATION 
Unlike Ohio, Georgia has statutorily prohibited the execution of mentally 
retarded individuals since 1988.79  Under the statute, a capital defendant in Georgia is 
mentally retarded if he or she has “significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning resulting in or associated with impairments in adaptive behavior which 
manifested during the developmental period.”80   
Also unlike Ohio, the determination of a Georgia capital defendant’s mental 
retardation is made by the trial jury rather than the trial judge.81 The jury must find 
the defendant to be mentally retarded “beyond a reasonable doubt.”82  The method by 
which this determination is made is similar to an insanity inquiry:  If the jury finds 
                                                                
72 Id. at 1016. 
73 Id. at 1014.   
74 Id. at 1014.  This presumption has in the past been rebutted.  See infra note 185 and 
accompanying text. 
75 Id. at 1016. 
76 Id. at 1015. 
77 Id. at 1015-16. 
78 Id. at 1016.  This Atkins claim will satisfy the timing requirements for a petition for 
post-conviction relief set forth in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.23(A)(1)(b) because “the 
Supreme Court has recognized a new federal right applying retroactively to convicted 
defendants facing the death penalty.”  Lott, 779 N.E.2d. at 1015. 
79 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (2005); see also Morrison v. State, 583 S.E.2d 873, 878 
(Ga. 2003) (“Atkins only established a federal constitutional prohibition on executing mentally 
retarded criminals, while Georgia has had its own such prohibition since 1988.”). 
80 § 17-7-131(a)(3). 
81 § 17-7-131(c)(3). 
82 Id.  
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the defendant to be guilty of the crime but also finds the defendant to be mentally 
retarded, then the jury returns a verdict of “guilty but mentally retarded.”83  Georgia 
law mandates the jury be instructed on the “guilty but mentally retarded” verdict 
where expert testimony indicates the defendant may be mentally retarded.84 
A defendant in Georgia not raising mental retardation at trial may still do so in a 
petition for habeas corpus.85  These habeas claims can be heard and granted under 
Georgia law which provides that, “[i]n all cases habeas corpus relief shall be granted 
to avoid a miscarriage of justice.”86  Initially, defendants filing mental retardation 
habeas claims arising from trials before the statute’s effective date were only 
required to prove their mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.87 
Currently, however, the preponderance standard is not applicable to mental 
retardation claims raised after the statute’s effective date.88  Thus, Georgia 
defendants raising mental retardation claims either at trial or by habeas corpus 
petition must now prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they are mentally retarded.89 
V.  THE DEFINITIONS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 
Before entering into an in-depth comparison of Ohio’s and Georgia’s procedures 
for determining mental retardation, it is first helpful to evaluate what it means to be 
mentally retarded.  Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions of mental retardation are 
substantively similar to each other and also to modern medical definitions.  Because 
both Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions reflect the modern medical world’s 
understanding of mental retardation, either could be adopted to supply a legal 
definition of mental retardation for Atkins purposes.   
In the United States today, approximately six to seven million persons suffer 
from mental retardation.90  A number of factors predispose a person to mental 
retardation.  These factors include heredity, environmental influence, mental 
disorders, pregnancy and perinatal problems (such as malnutrition or prematurity), 
early alterations of embryonic development (for example, prenatal damage due to 
toxins), and general medical conditions acquired during infancy or childhood.91  Two 
national medical authorities, the American Psychiatric Association and the American 
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR), have offered definitions and analyses 
                                                                
83 Id. 
84 See Mack v. State, 425 S.E.2d 671, 672-73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (awarding a new trial 
where expert testimony indicated defendant was mentally retarded but the trial court did not 
instruct the jury that it could consider the verdict of guilty but mentally retarded). 
85 See, e.g., Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339, 342 (Ga. 1989) (permitting a defendant to 
raise by habeas petition a mental retardation claim); Turpin v. Hill, 498 S.E.2d 52, 53 (Ga. 
1998) (same). 
86 Turpin, 498 S.E.2d at 53; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-14-48(d) (2005). 
87 Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at 342. 
88 Turpin, 498 S.E.2d at 53. 
89 Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 622 (Ga. 2003). 
90 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1. 
91 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 45-46. 
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of what constitutes mental retardation.92  These two definitions are similar to each 
other and to Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions of mental retardation. 
The American Psychiatric Association defines mental retardation as 
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning…that is 
accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least 
two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, 
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, 
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.  The onset 
must occur before age 18 years.93 
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Textual Revision (DSM-IV-TR), covers all 
mental disorders, including mental retardation, for children and adults.94  The DSM-
IV-TR sets forth several “degrees” of severity of mental retardation.95  Individuals 
with an I.Q. level of between fifty and fifty-five to approximately seventy have “mild 
mental retardation.”96  Mild mental retardation is the most common level of 
retardation.97  Approximately eighty-five percent of those with mental retardation fall 
into this category.98  Individuals with an I.Q. level between thirty-five and forty to 
fifty and fifty-five have “moderate mental retardation.”99  About ten percent of those 
with mental retardation suffer from “moderate retardation.”100  Individuals with an 
I.Q. level between twenty and twenty-five to thirty-five and forty have “severe 
mental retardation.”101  About three to four percent of those with mental retardation 
suffer from “severe mental retardation.”102  Approximately one to two percent of 
mentally retarded persons have an I.Q. below twenty or twenty-five and suffer from 
“profound mental retardation.”103  
The AAMR defines mental retardation as  
substantial limitations in present functioning.  It is characterized by 
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently 
                                                                
92 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.3 (2002) (citing definitions of mental 
retardation by the American Association on Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric 
Association).   
93 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41. 
94 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32. 
95 Id. at 42. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 42. 
100 Id. at 43. 
101 Id. at 42. 
102 Id. at 43. 
103 Id. at 42-44. 
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with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable 
adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, 
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, 
leisure, and work.  Mental retardation manifests itself before age 18.104 
Unlike the DSM-IV-TR, the AAMR does not offer any break down of “degrees” 
of mental retardation.  The two definitions are similar, however, as both contain 
several common elements.   
Common elements in both the DSM-IV-TR and the AAMR definitions of mental 
retardation include the following: significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning, limitations in two or more adaptive skill areas, and onset before age 
eighteen.105  Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning refers to a low 
I.Q., usually below seventy or seventy five.106  The I.Q. is measured by an 
assessment with one or more of the standardized, individually administered 
intelligence tests.107  There is a margin of error in the I.Q. tests of approximately five 
points.108 Adaptive skills measure how effectively individuals are able to cope with 
common demands of everyday life without support, and how well they meet the 
standards of personal independence expected of one in their age group, community 
setting, and sociocultural background.109  These adaptive skill areas include 
communication, self-care, social skills, self-direction, functional academics, health 
and safety, home living, leisure, and work.110  Adaptive skills are evidenced by 
reliable independent sources such as teacher evaluations, and educational, 
developmental, and medical history.111  Defining these adaptive skills, however, has 
been difficult and has in the past led to challenges of mental retardation diagnoses in 
criminal cases.112 
                                                                
104 AAMR, supra note 32, at 5. 
105 Compare DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41 (setting forth the definition of mental 
retardation), with AAMR, supra note 32, at 5 (same). 
106 Compare DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41 (stating that an I.Q. of about seventy or 
below constitutes significantly subaverage intellectual functioning), with AAMR, supra note 
32, at 5 (“[A]n I.Q. standard score of approximately 70 or 75 or below, based on an 
assessment that includes one or more individually administered general intelligence tests 
developed for the purpose of assessing intellectual functioning.”). 
107 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41.  These standardized intelligence tests include the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children, third edition, the Kaufman Assessment Battery for 
Children, and the Standford-Binet, fourth edition.  Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Compare DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 42 (“[H]ow effectively individuals cope with 
common life demands and how well they meet standards of personal independence expected 
of someone in their particular age group, sociocultural background, and community setting.”), 
with AAMR, supra note 32, at 6 (“These skill areas are central to successful life functioning 
and are frequently related to the need for supports for persons with mental retardation.”). 
110 AAMR, supra note 32, at 6; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41. 
111 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 42. 
112 AAMR, supra note 32, at 149. 
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It is important to test individually for mental retardation in order to provide 
adequate attention to the individual’s ethnic, cultural, or linguistic background, each 
of which may affect test results.113 I.Q. tests have been criticized by some researchers 
because they may be biased by minority status or low socioeconomic standing.114  
I.Q. tests still have some value, despite criticism, because they “provide[] the 
practical benefit of a consistent standard generally accepted by mental health 
professionals.”115  Further, measuring adaptive skills will supplement I.Q. tests as an 
indicator of the defendant’s mental retardation.116 
Because mental retardation is manifested initially during the time in which 
developmental processes are occurring, both the AAMR and the DSM-IV-TR require 
that mental retardation manifest itself before the age of eighteen.117  Requiring 
mental retardation to manifest itself before the age of eighteen serves another less 
evident purpose: It operates as an intrinsic protection against feigning mental 
retardation.118  This is so because individuals seeking to “feign” mental retardation119 
to escape the death penalty will have to show its onset prior to age eighteen.  
Because mental retardation is often documented at an early age through intelligence 
tests, it is particularly difficult for a non-mentally retarded individual to show that, at 
an early age, he or she suffered from mental retardation.120 
Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions of mental retardation are very similar to those 
propounded by the AAMR and the DSM-IV-TR.  Adopting one of these definitions 
to serve as the legal standard ensures that courts apply Atkins consistently and 
eliminates any possible confusion that may result from utilizing a complex definition 
of mental retardation.121  Although many other definitions of mental retardation are 
similar to Ohio’s and Georgia’s, differences in statutory wording suggest states with 
different definitions of mental retardation may undergo a slightly different analysis.  
For example, Florida defines mental retardation as “significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and 
manifested during the period from conception to age 18.”122  Although this definition 
                                                                
113 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 46. 
114 Bing, supra note 26, at 73-75. 
115 Id. at 75. 
116 Lyndsey Sloan, Comment, Evolving Standards of Decency: The Evolution of a 
National Consensus Granting the Mentally Retarded Sanctuary, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 351, 365 
(2003). 
117 AAMR, supra note 32, at 16; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41. 
118 Bing, supra note 26, at 90. 
119 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 353 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also infra 
note 178.  
120 Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Defendant to Death: Charting the 
Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death 
Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911, 916 (2001). 
121 Raines, supra note 25, at 197. 
122 FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2005); see also Raines, supra note 25, at 197 n.194 (citing 
Florida and Kansas statutes). 
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appears in-line with Ohio’s and Georgia’s definitions, a closer examination reveals a 
potential for confusion.  Florida defines “significantly subaverge general intellectual 
functioning” as “two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a 
standardized intelligence test.”123  This definition, different from Ohio’s and 
Georgia’s, appears facially more difficult for the average person to understand.124  
Creating a national definition of mental retardation would ensure that all states 
undergo the same analysis in determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded.  
Using definitions that are similar to modern medical definitions of mental retardation 
would ensure that the legal world is in accord with the medical world.  Also, 
requiring a definition of mental retardation that mirrors the medical world’s 
definition would ensure that Atkins protections are equally available to all.   
As discussed above, Ohio’s definition of mental retardation contains the three 
main elements covered in both the AAMR and the DSM-IV-TR definitions of mental 
retardation: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, limitations in two or 
more adaptive skills, and onset before age eighteen.125  Ohio creates a rebuttable 
presumption that a defendant is not mentally retarded if his or her I.Q. is above 
seventy.126  Therefore, Ohio’s definition of mental retardation acknowledges the 
problems inherent in I.Q. testing127 and allows an individual with an I.Q. slightly 
higher than seventy to rebut the presumption and prove that he or she is mentally 
retarded.128  Also, Ohio’s definition reflects the DSM-IV-TR and the AAMR 
assumption that a low I.Q. generally means an I.Q. below seventy or seventy-five.129 
Ohio does not exclude from the death penalty individuals who would otherwise meet 
its definition of mental retardation but for the fact that their brain injury and adaptive 
behavior deficits occurred after age eighteen.130  In one Ohio case, State v. Stallings, 
the defendant raised an Atkins claim seeking to escape execution on the grounds that 
he was mentally retarded.131  After evidentiary hearings, the trial court denied 
Stallings’s Atkins claim because he could not establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the onset of his mental retardation occurred before he reached age 
                                                                
123 § 921.137(1). Kansas offers the same definition of “significantly subaverge general 
intellectual functioning.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-12b01(i) (2005) (“‘Significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning’ means performance which is two or more standard deviations 
from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified by the secretary.”). 
124 See Raines, supra note 25, at 197-98 (arguing that the older definition of mental 
retardation, like that used by Florida, was difficult for laypersons to understand). 
125 State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ohio 2002).  
126 Id. 
127 See Bing, supra note 26, at 75 (“The IQ score should continue to be questioned as an 
absolute measure of intelligence, but since there is no adequate replacement, it should not be 
ignored.”). 
128 Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1014. This presumption has, in fact, been rebutted.  See infra note 
185 and accompanying text.   
129 AAMR, supra note 32, at 5; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 41. 
130 State v. Stallings, No. 21969, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4167, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2004). 
131 Id. at *2. 
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eighteen.132  Thus, Ohio’s definition of mental retardation follows both the AAMR 
and the DSM-IV-TR definitions. 
Georgia’s definition of mental retardation also contains the three main elements 
of the AAMR and the DSM-IV-TR definitions of mental retardation.  There are 
some notable differences, however, as the Georgia statute does not expressly require 
a set amount of impairments in adaptive skills (the AAMR, DSM-IV-TR, and Ohio 
definitions require at least two)133 and also requires mental retardation to manifest 
itself during the “developmental period” as opposed to age eighteen.134  Despite these 
facial differences, Georgia’s definition of mental retardation operates similarly to the 
AAMR, the DSM-IV-TR, and the Ohio definitions.  First, the Georgia Supreme 
Court has looked for deficiencies in two or more adaptive skills to determine the 
defendant did not possess the requisite impairments to be mentally retarded.135  
Second, the Georgia Supreme Courts has treated the manifestation of mental 
retardation during the “developmental period” as occurring before age eighteen.136  
Finally, Georgia courts appear to have adopted the assumption that mental 
retardation is usually indicated by an I.Q. score below seventy.137  On the whole, the 
Georgia definition appears in operation similar to the Ohio, the AAMR, and the 
DSM-IV-TR definitions of mental retardation. The slight difference in wording, 
however, between Georgia’s definition and the other definitions of mental 
retardation, may result in confusion in its application. Accordingly, to ensure 
consistency, only one of these definitions should be utilized as a national definition 
of mental retardation for Atkins purposes.138 
Overall, the Ohio and Georgia definitions appear to match those offered by the 
AAMR and the DSM-IV-TR.  As such, either of these definitions could be adopted 
to serve as a national legal definition to guide states in determining mental 
retardation.  Requiring only one definition reduces the possibility of confusion that 
may result from facially complicated statutes such as Florida’s.139  A uniform 
                                                                
132 Id. at *10; see also State v. Thomas, 779 N.E.2d 1017, 1038 (Ohio 2002) (“[E]vidence 
of defendant’s mental deficiencies might be traced to his 1981 injury, when [defendant] was in 
his mid-20s, and would therefore not meet the definition of ‘mental retardation’ of most states 
that prohibit execution of the mentally retarded.”). 
133 Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1014 (holding that a capital defendant in Ohio alleging that he or 
she is mentally retarded must show “significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills”) 
(emphasis added). 
134 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3) (2005). 
135 See, e.g., Foster v. State, 525 S.E.2d 78, 79 (Ga. 2000) (looking to defendant’s 
“interaction with others, his letter writing, newspaper reading, and sports activities” to 
determine defendant did not meet the statutory definition of mental retardation). 
136 Id. at 79 (“Evidence was adduced from which the jury could have found that IQ tests 
administered to Foster when he was ten and nearly seventeen years old showed that he was not 
mentally retarded.”). 
137 See, e.g., Morrison v. State, 583 S.E.2d 873, 875 (Ga. 2003) (“The generally accepted 
I.Q. score for an indication of mental retardation is 70 or below.”). 
138 Raines, supra note 25, at 197. 
139 See FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2005); see also infra note 258 and accompanying text. 
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definition also would ensure that all states that impose the death penalty offer Atkins 
protections equally. 
VI.  MENTAL RETARDATION SHOULD BE PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE 
“Preponderance of the evidence” is a lower standard of proof than “beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”140  Specifically, it is the lowest burden of proof used by American 
courts.141  Preponderance of the evidence has been defined as “superior evidentiary 
weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, 
is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather 
than the other.”142  In other words, preponderance of the evidence translates into 
“more likely than not.”143  Conversely, beyond a reasonable doubt has been defined 
as “the doubt that prevents one from being firmly convinced of a defendant’s guilt, 
or the belief that there is a real possibility that a defendant is not guilty.”144  In other 
words, proof beyond a reasonable doubt translates into “proof to a virtual 
certainty.”145  These definitions conform to instructions given to juries by Ohio and 
Georgia courts.146  Though usually only applied in civil cases, the preponderance 
standard is particularly applicable to mental retardation because of the great risk of 
error; an erroneous finding of “not mentally retarded” results in a death sentence, 
whereas an erroneous finding of “mentally retarded” results in a life sentence.147   
Ohio’s use of the preponderance of the evidence standard is the better standard 
for determining whether a capital defendant is mentally retarded.  First, Georgia’s 
use of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to determine mental retardation is 
                                                                
140 Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 
AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 251 (2002). 
141 Id. 
142 Raines, supra note 25, at 198 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (7th ed. 1999)). 
143 Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 140, at 251. 
144 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (8th ed. 2004). 
145 Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 140, at 251. 
146 See GEORGIA SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 209.60 (2003) (defining proof 
by a “preponderance of the evidence”); 4-503 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 503.011(5) (2005) 
(defining proof “beyond a reasonable doubt”); 4-409 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 409.60(2) 
(2005) (defining proof by a “preponderance of the evidence”).  The Georgia pattern jury 
instructions do not appear to define proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Although Georgia but 
not Ohio submits the mental retardation issue to the jury, the instructions provided by both 
states show general uniformity in defining these burdens of proof. 
147 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (2005) (requiring a jury who finds a defendant 
“guilty but mentally retarded” to sentence the defendant to “imprisonment for life”); State v. 
Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ohio 2002) (remanding to trial court to determine whether the 
defendant is mentally retarded and cannot be sentenced to death.); see also Raines, supra note 
25, at 199 (arguing that states should err on the side of caution and adopt a lower standard of 
proof for use in determining mental retardation). 
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inconsistent with its burden of proving affirmative defenses.148  Second, it is better to 
have a lower standard of proof when dealing with individuals possessing reduced 
mental capacity.149  Also, there is no evidence to suggest that non-mentally retarded 
defendants are able to take advantage of the lower standard of proof in Ohio in order 
to escape the death penalty.150  The higher standard of proof could cause inconsistent 
and arbitrary results; a defendant adjudged mentally retarded in Ohio could be 
adjudged not mentally retarded in Georgia, which would defeat the purpose of 
Atkins.151 
The difference of imposing each burden of proof is clear: A Georgia defendant 
trying to establish his mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt would have to 
provide significantly more evidence.  For example, he would need more experts to 
testify as to his mental capacity.152 This increased burden is unduly harsh particularly 
because “[i]t is difficult for the mentally retarded defendant to contribute adequately 
to his [or her] defense, regardless of whether he [or she] has been declared competent 
by the court.”153 An Ohio defendant attempting to prove his or her mental retardation 
by a preponderance of the evidence would only have to show “more-likely-than-not” 
that he or she is mentally retarded to obtain a life sentence.154  By contrast, a Georgia 
defendant would have to show by “virtual certainty” that he or she is mentally 
retarded to escape the death penalty.155  Because the mentally retarded have an 
underdeveloped conception of blameworthiness, a lack of knowledge of basic facts, 
and increased susceptibility to the influence of authority figures,156 a lesser standard 
of proof appears necessary to accommodate retarded individuals.157  Accordingly, the 
                                                                
148 See, e.g., Chandle v. State, 198 S.E.2d 289 (Ga. 1973) (holding defendants in Georgia 
must prove affirmative defenses by a “preponderance of the evidence”); See also Raines, supra 
note 25, at 198. 
149 Bing, supra note 26, at 135; Raines, supra note 25, at 199. 
150 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 178-86 and 
accompanying text. 
151 See Orpen, supra note 21, at 95. 
152 See James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 489 (1985) (determining mental retardation often requires a 
“personality assessment, adaptive behavior assessment, moral development examination, 
speech and language evaluation, motoric functioning evaluation, or academic achievement 
evaluation – as well as mental retardation forensic evaluations in the indicated legal issues”). 
153 Bing, supra note 26, at 145; see also Raines, supra note 25, at 199 (“Because of the 
nature of mental retardation, it is often more difficult for these offenders to contribute 
adequately to their defense.”). 
154 Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 140, at 251. 
155 Id. 
156 Bing, supra note 26, at 72. 
157 See Raines, supra note 25, at 199 (“[A] lesser standard of proof than reasonable doubt 
should be used because a higher standard places a greater burden on the mentally retarded 
defendant.”). 
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preponderance standard “acknowledges the procedural difficulties mentally retarded 
people face when they encounter the criminal justice system.”158   
Georgia’s use of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof is inconsistent 
with Georgia’s and Ohio’s burdens of proving affirmative defenses.159  “Affirmative 
defenses are those in which the defendant admits doing the act charged but seeks to 
justify, excuse, or mitigate his [or her] conduct.”160  Defendants in Georgia and Ohio 
bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence.161  Georgia’s burden of proving mental retardation is thus inconsistent with 
the burden necessary to prove affirmative defenses.  As stated above, a defendant 
alleging mental retardation has a lessened criminal culpability, which justifies 
reducing his or her sentence from death to life imprisonment.162  Similarly, a 
defendant raising an affirmative defense seeks to “justify, excuse, or mitigate his 
conduct.”163  Therefore, it is inconsistent to permit a defendant to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his or her conduct was justified by way of an 
affirmative defense, but then to require the same defendant to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that his or her sentence should be reduced because of mental 
retardation.  
As mentioned above, the determination of mental retardation in Georgia works 
similar to an insanity inquiry: A jury finds the defendant to be “guilty but mentally 
retarded” if the requisite criteria for establishing mental retardation are deemed to be 
met.164  There is, however, an illogical difference between these two inquiries and 
their respective standards of proof.  A Georgia defendant alleging to be insane must 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she did “not have mental 
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to [the crime].”165  If the 
defendant is successful in his or her insanity claim, the defendant is “committed to a 
state mental health facility until such time, if ever, that the court is satisfied that he or 
she should be released pursuant to law.”166  By contrast, a Georgia defendant with 
mental retardation must show beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she has 
“significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning resulting in or associated 
                                                                
158Bing, supra note 26, at 134-35. 
159 See Raines, supra note 25, at 199 (“[M]ental retardation will be an affirmative 
defense.”). 
160 Carlson v. State, 524 S.E.2d 283, 286 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
161 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (West 2005) (stating defendant must prove an 
affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence); Chandle, 198 S.E.2d at 291 (same). 
162 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).  
163 Carlson, 524 S.E.2d at 286. 
164 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(1) (2005) (“The defendant may be found ‘not 
guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the crime’ if he meets the criteria of Code Section 
16-3-2 or 16-3-3 at the time of the commission of the crime.”), with § 17-7-131(c)(3) (“The 
defendant may be found ‘guilty but mentally retarded’ if the jury, or court acting as trier of 
facts, finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged and is 
mentally retarded.”). 
165 § 16-3-2 (2005). 
166 § 17-7-131(b)(3)(A). 
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with impairments in adaptive behavior which manifested during the developmental 
period.”167  Thus, the mentally retarded defendant likewise has a diminished 
culpability but, unlike the insane defendant who seeks to avoid jail, only seeks a 
reduction in sentence.168  It is therefore inconsistent for Georgia to require the 
purported retarded defendant to prove his or her mental retardation beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and only to require the alleged insane defendant to establish his or 
her insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.169  Georgia should lower the burden 
of proving mental retardation to that necessary for proving insanity. 
Georgia’s requirement of proving mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt 
is also inconsistent with the burden of proof previously applied by Georgia courts to 
establish mental retardation.170  Specifically, defendants alleging mental retardation 
before the adoption of the statute were only required to prove mental retardation by a 
preponderance of the evidence.171  Defendants alleging mental retardation after the 
effective date of Georgia’s statute, however, must prove mental retardation beyond a 
reasonable doubt.172  The result is unfair because  “[i]n effect, the [Georgia] court 
stated that by passing an exemption of the death penalty for the mentally retarded, 
the legislature meant to make it harder for a mentally retarded defendant to prove his 
[or her] retardation.”173   
More pragmatic reasons exist for requiring mental retardation be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Mentally retarded individuals by definition have a 
reduced mental capacity and have a greater difficulty contributing to their defense 
than do non-mentally retarded defendants.174  Also, mentally retarded individuals, as 
a result of their reduced mental capacity, are more susceptible to police coercion.175  
                                                                
167 § 17-7-131(a)(3). 
168 See § 17-7-131(j) (2005) (“In the trial of any case in which the death penalty is sought 
which commences on or after July 1, 1988, should the judge find in accepting a plea of guilty 
but mentally retarded or the jury or court find in its verdict that the defendant is guilty of the 
crime charged but mentally retarded, the death penalty shall not be imposed and the court shall 
sentence the defendant to imprisonment for life.”). 
169 See, e.g., Durham v. State, 238 S.E.2d 334, 336 (Ga. 1977) (“The defendant bears the 
burden of showing, by preponderance of the evidence, that he was not mentally responsible at 
the time of the alleged crime.”). 
170 Bing, supra note 26, at 135. Compare Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339, 342-43 (Ga. 
1988) (holding that defendants who allege mental retardation prior to the effective date of GA. 
CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2005) are required to prove mental retardation by a “preponderance of 
the evidence”), with Turpin v. Hill, 498 S.E.2d 52, 54 (Ga. 1998) (holding that defendants who 
are tried after the effective date of section 17-7-131 are required to prove mental retardation 
“beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
171 Fleming, 386 S.E.2d at 342-43. 
172 Turpin, 498 S.E.2d at 54; § 17-7-131(c)(3). 
173 Bing, supra note 26, at 135. 
174 Id. at 145; Raines, supra note 25, at 199. 
175 Entzeroth, supra note 120, at 917; Raines, supra note 25, at 199; see also Ellis &. 
Luckasson, supra note 152, at 428, 446 (arguing the mentally retarded are predisposed to 
affirmatively answering questions they find desirable, which can “directly affect the likelihood 
of receiving a biased response”). 
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In fact, evidence produced in Atkins shows that Atkins’s testimony was less credible 
and coherent, possibly due to diminished mental capacity, than his alleged 
accomplice, whose testimony “was obviously credited by the jury and was sufficient 
to establish Atkins’[sic] guilt.”176  As evidenced by Atkins, testimony of allegedly 
mentally retarded defendants may be given less weight than testimony of defendants 
who do not allege mental retardation.177  Therefore, the mentally retarded should be 
afforded safeguards such as a reduced standard of proof to compensate for their 
intellectual limitations.   
One criticism of using the preponderance standard is that non-mentally retarded 
capital defendants may be successful “feigning” mental retardation to escape the 
death penalty.178  Cases in Ohio and Georgia, however, suggest otherwise.  For 
example, the Georgia Supreme Court applied the pre-statutory preponderance 
standard and found a defendant to be not mentally retarded by a preponderance of 
the evidence.179  The court found that I.Q. tests administered to the defendant 
“showed that he was not mentally retarded [and the lower I.Q. scores] resulted from 
depression or malingering.”180  The defendant was unsuccessful in proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally retarded.181  Thus, it appears 
unnecessary for Georgia to utilize a higher standard of proof. 
Ohio courts have also effectively used the preponderance standard.  In one case, a 
defendant with an I.Q. of sixty-nine could not prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he was mentally retarded.182  In so finding, the court relied on the 
defendant’s writings and lack of significant limitations in adaptive skills.183 In 
another Ohio case, by contrast, a defendant with an I.Q. over seventy was able to 
overcome the rebuttable presumption184 and prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he was mentally retarded.185  To find the defendant mentally retarded, 
the court relied on evidence showing the defendant’s subaverage intellectual 
functioning and significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills that occurred 
                                                                
176 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).  
177 Id. at 307. 
178 Matthew Debbis, Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment Prohibits the Execution of Mentally Retarded Defendants: Atkins v. Virginia, 41 
DUQ. L. REV. 811, 824 (2003); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia 
argued that unlike insane capital defendants who, upon a finding of insanity, risk spending 
time in a mental institution until he or she is cured, “the capital defendant who feigns mental 
retardation risks nothing at all.”  Id.  Justice Scalia’s criticism is also applicable to a reduced 
standard of proof; a reduced standard of proof offers greater opportunity for capital defendants 
to “feign” mental retardation to avoid the death sentence. 
179 Foster v. State, 525 S.E.2d 78, 79 (Ga. 2000). 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 State v. Were, No. C-030485, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 348, at *30 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 
4, 2005). 
183 Id. 
184See supra note 75 and accompanying text.   
185 State v. Gumm, No. B-9205608, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 9, 2005).  
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before defendant reached age eighteen.186  Thus, Ohio does not appear to allow non-
mentally retarded defendants who allege mental retardation to escape the death 
penalty. 
Ohio and Georgia cases demonstrate that requiring defendants to prove mental 
retardation by a preponderance of the evidence is more appropriate.  In these states, 
courts work carefully to ensure that a defendant is mentally retarded before reducing 
the sentence.187  Case law in Ohio and Georgia suggests that the preponderance of the 
evidence standard is sufficient to prevent a capital defendant from “feigning” mental 
retardation in order to escape the death penalty.188  Even if an individual is 
incorrectly adjudged to be mentally retarded, arguably “[i]t is better to incorrectly 
find that a person is mentally retarded and impose a lesser penalty than to execute 
someone who is incorrectly found to be not retarded.”189   
Because of the different standards of proof, it is possible that the same defendant 
could be found mentally retarded in Ohio but not in Georgia.190  In other words, a 
defendant may succeed in proving his or her mental retardation by a preponderance 
of the evidence, but he may be unable to prove his mental retardation beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The Georgia defendant, though adjudged mentally retarded in 
Ohio, may still be put to death.  This works contrary to Atkins, which aims to 
prohibit the execution of all mentally retarded capital defendants, not just those 
defendants that all states agree are mentally retarded.191 
VII. ALLOWING THE JURY TO DETERMINE MENTAL RETARDATION CREATES A RISK 
OF BIAS 
Jurors may be biased toward a capital defendant, and an allegation of mental 
retardation potentially exacerbates this bias.  Jurors, who are unfamiliar with the law 
and its application, may ignore the court’s instructions and instead “impose 
distinctive rules and procedures that mix various aspects of weighing, matching, and 
moralizing.”192  Further, a capital jury may disregard statutory aggravating and 
mitigating sentencing guidelines and instead base guilt purely on what it subjectively 
thinks appropriate.193  In fact, one study found that forty percent of “capital jurors 
                                                                
186 Id. at 6-9. 
187 It is noteworthy that Were was unable to prove he was mentally retarded by a 
“preponderance of the evidence” even in the absence of the rebuttable presumption that he was 
not mentally retarded.  Were, 2005 LEXIS 348, at *30. Compare this with Gumm who was 
able to overcome the rebuttable presumption and prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” 
he was mentally retarded.  Gumm, slip op. at 1. 
188 See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text. 
189 Raines, supra note 25, at 199. 
190 See Orpen, supra note 21, at 95. 
191 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
192 William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early 
Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1073 (1995). 
193 Id. at 1074.  One study reported that a majority of jurors (thirty-five out of fifty-four) 
were influenced little or not at all by statutory aggravating and mitigating guidelines.  Id.  The 
most common aggravator in the study was “a presumption of death as the appropriate 
punishment as indicated by ‘the view that death was to be the punishment for first degree 
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believed that they were required to impose the death penalty if they found that the 
crime was heinous, vile, or depraved, and [thirty percent] thought that the death 
penalty was required if they found that the defendant would be dangerous in the 
future.”194  Indeed, capital jurors are often concerned that the capital defendant will 
cause harm to others in the future.195  Because jurors may already be predisposed to 
bias toward the capital defendant,196 it is necessary to examine how this bias may 
affect the capital defendant alleging mental retardation. 
A question Atkins left unanswered is whether the defendant alleging mental 
retardation has a right to have a judge or a jury decide the issue.197  Ohio’s and 
Georgia’s Atkins procedures offer different answers to this question.  Ohio requires 
the judge to determine whether the defendant is mentally retarded for Atkins 
purposes.198  By contrast, Georgia requires the jury to determine whether the 
defendant is mentally retarded.199  Although the judge may harbor some bias toward 
the alleged mentally retarded defendant, the jury presents a greater risk of biasing the 
defendant.  A judge is trained200 to be impartial, and takes an oath to that effect.201 
Likewise, the jury is required to give an oath pledging impartiality202 and may be 
subject to removal for cause.203  Jurors, however, unlike judges, do not regularly204 
                                                           
murder, or at least that death was presumed appropriate unless [the] defendant could persuade 
the jury otherwise.’”  Id.  
194 Id. at 1091.  This study was based on three to four hour interviews with eighty to one 
hundred twenty capital jurors from several states.  Id. at 1043. 
195 Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What do Jurors 
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1539 (1998). 
196 The author takes no general stance on jury bias at capital trials.  The purpose of this 
information is to suggest that juries may be biased toward capital defendants, and this potential 
for bias increases dramatically with a mental retardation claim. 
197 Orpen, supra note 21, at 95. 
198 State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002).  
199 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3). 
200 Pursuant to its ethical rules, Ohio has set up a judicial college to “[p]rovide a 
comprehensive program of continuing education for the judges . . . of [Ohio].” SUP. CT. RULES 
FOR THE GOV’T OF THE JUDICIARY OF OHIO R. V § 1(B)(2), available at 
http://www.sconet.state. oh.us/Rules/government/#rulev.  
201 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3.23 (2005) (setting forth oath of office for judges); see 
also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 107.05 (2005) (“A judge of a court of record . . . or judge of a 
county court, shall be ineligible to perform any duty pertaining to his office until he presents 
to the proper official a legal certificate of his election or appointment, and receives from the 
governor a commission to fill such office.”).  Thus, the judge must receive support from the 
governor of Ohio before he or she can perform his or her duties as judge. See Id.   
202 GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-138 (2005) (“Each panel of the trial jury shall take the 
following oath: ‘You shall well and truly try each case submitted to you during the present 
term and a true verdict give, according to the law as given you in charge and the opinion you 
entertain of the evidence produced to you, to the best of your skill and knowledge, without 
favor or affection to either party, provided you are not discharged from the consideration of 
the case submitted.  So help you God.”). 
203 GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-164 (2005). 
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weigh facts impartially and are usually not skilled in the law.205  Because of the 
judge’s training and experience with the law, it is less likely the judge will succumb 
to bias on a particularly sensitive issue such as mental retardation.  Thus, Ohio’s 
mandate that the judge determine mental retardation is most appropriate here because 
the jury has a greater risk of biasing the defendant and making an incorrect 
determination of the defendant’s retardation. 
Mentally retarded individuals behave in a variety of different ways.  They do not 
have specific personality or behavioral features.206  They may be passive, placid, 
dependant, or aggressive and impulsive.207 In other words, their retardation may be 
difficult to recognize or distinguish.  Mentally retarded individuals may alienate 
juries by smiling, sleeping, or staring in court, which may give the jury “a false 
impression of callousness or lack of remorse.”208  It is therefore entirely possible that 
jurors may misunderstand the mentally retarded defendant and fail to appreciate the 
difference between guilt and culpability.  Jurors  
see a defendant who looks normal, is not manifestly “crazy,” and they do 
not grasp for the profound yet subtle ways a person with retardation is 
limited in his capacity to understand the world around him and to act 
appropriately.  They see a defendant who is not acting “remorseful” in the 
courtroom and they think it is because he is callous and heartless rather 
than understanding that a person with mental retardation may not fully 
comprehend what is happening.  Finally, jurors can see mental retardation 
as an aggravating factor, i.e. they believe it portends that the defendant’s 
future dangerousness, and they are worried that if given a prison sentence 
he will one day be released to society and commit another violent 
crime.209 
The jury’s preexisting bias toward a capital defendant may have a heightened 
impact on a capital defendant alleging mental retardation.  This bias may be deep-
seeded, as evidenced by the fact that the mentally retarded in the past have been 
                                                           
204 See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-3 (2005) (“No person shall be compellable to serve on the 
grand or trial jury of the superior court or on any jury in other courts for more than four weeks 
in any year.”).  Unlike the judge who sits for an elected term of years, the jury sits only for a 
few weeks. 
205 See Christopher Slobogin, Is Atkins the Antithesis or Apotheosis of AntiDiscrimination 
Principles?: Sorting Out the Groupwide Effects of Exempting People with Mental Retardation 
from the Death Penalty, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1011, 1107 (2004) (arguing that capital juries “often 
treat mental disorder not as a mitigating circumstance (as the law requires) but as an 
aggravating circumstance supporting imposition of the death penalty”); see also Bing, supra 
note 26, at 89  (“Jurors may deem the defendant’s retardation irrelevant if he is declared 
competent to stand trial.”); Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26, 39 (2000) (reporting that some jurors believe they could only consider 
a mitigating factor if it was included in the state’s death penalty statute).  
206 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 32, at 44. 
207 Id. 
208 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1. 
209 Id. 
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referred to as “idiots” and were often sterilized and segregated from society.210  The 
mentally retarded were in the past believed to be more criminally dangerous than 
non-retarded persons.211  Although mental health professionals have rejected these 
stereotypes,212 they may linger in jurors’ minds and can play a role in sentencing and 
determining guilt.  There is an assumption that mental disorders create an increased 
risk that the person will harm himself, herself or others.213 In fact, in a recent survey, 
participants “reported less competence and increased expectations of violence if they 
labeled the . . . person as having a mental illness.”214  Also, the mentally retarded face 
hostility, condescension, and stereotyping both at school and at work.215  These 
stereotypes also make themselves public on television, as “what passes for humor on 
television programs such as ‘Saturday Night Live’ often consists of the presentation 
of demeaning stereotypes of children and adults with mental retardation . . . .”216  
Jurors typically show little mercy in making a sentencing recommendation if the 
capital defendant shows no remorse.217  As discussed above, the mentally retarded 
often do not understand the proceedings transpiring around them,218 they have poor 
attention span and focus,219 and they often attempt to prevent discovery of their 
handicap.220  Such behavior may appear to a jury as lack of remorse, when instead it 
is a side effect of the defendant’s mental handicap.  Thus, the juror, who may be 
unfamiliar with the behaviors characteristic of mental retardation may fail to 
recognize retardation and accordingly fail to find the defendant “guilty but mentally 
retarded,” leaving open the possibility of a death sentence.221  One scholar has stated 
                                                                
210 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 152, at 416, 419 (“The measures alarmists thought 
necessary to prevent the corrosion of society by the presumed criminality of retarded people 
included the sterilization of all ‘feeble-minded’ people and their permanent segregation from 
society.”). 
211 Id. at 419. 
212 Id. at 420. 
213 Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., The Public’s View of the Competence, Dangerousness, 
and the Need for Legal Coercion of Persons with Mental Health Problems, 89 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1339, 1339 (1999). 
214 Id. at 1343.  Although mental illness differs from mental retardation, it is important to 
note that the public, including jurors, are often unaware of the differences between mental 
illness and mental retardation.  See Bing, supra note 26, at 87 (“Jurors are unlikely to have a 
full grasp of mental retardation, including the difference between this condition and mental 
illness.”). 
215 Mark C. Weber, The Americans with Disability Act and Employment: A Non-
Retrospecive, 52 ALA. L. REV. 375, 398 (2000). 
216 Id. at 398-99. 
217 Garvey, supra note 195, at 1539. 
218 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1. 
219 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 152, at 429. 
220 Id. at 429-30. 
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that, “[s]imply put, there is a grave risk that juries do not understand the issues [of 
mental retardation] well enough to make the life and death decision required of them.  
Mental retardation remains, to most people, a mysterious affliction.”222 
Some jurors also believe mental retardation makes the capital defendant more 
dangerous.223  For example, one juror explained, “[i]t appears to us that there is all 
the more reason to execute a killer if he is also. . . retarded.  Killers often kill again; 
[a] retarded killer is more to be feared than a . . . normal killer.  There is also far less 
possibility of his ever becoming a useful citizen.”224  Although Georgia jurors are 
required to determine mental retardation at the penalty phase of trial, if the jurors 
reject the “guilty but mentally retarded” verdict,225 mental retardation becomes 
nothing more than a mitigating circumstance that the jury can give little weight.226  
Juries at the sentencing phase may treat mental retardation as an aggravating 
circumstance rather than a mitigating factor.227 The jury thus could, because of want 
of proof or even bias, refuse to find the defendant “guilty but mentally retarded,” 
choose to give little weight to the defendant’s retardation as a mitigating factor, and 
sentence him or her to death. 
Though evidence suggests that some jurors may be biased, not all are.  Many 
jurors may weigh aggravating and mitigating evidence pursuant to statutory 
                                                           
221 Although a defendant raising an Atkins claim will be telegraphing to the jury that he 
may be mentally retarded, the jury, uneducated in the medical field, may disregard, or fail to 
understand the retardation claim and attribute the defendant’s behavior to his criminality. 
222 Dick-Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 723-24. 
223 See Slobogin, supra note 205, at 1107 (“Research clearly shows that, despite the fact 
that offenders with serious disorders are no more likely to reoffend [sic] than the general 
offender population, the public tends to equate mental disorder with dangerousness.”); 
Pescosolido et al., supra note 213, at 1341, cites a study in which “[a]lmost 17% of the sample 
indicated that even the ‘troubled person’ was either very or somewhat likely to do something 
violent toward others.  That percentage rose to 33.3% for the depression vignette and to more 
than 60% for the schizophrenia vignette.”  Id.  Although mental illness and mental retardation 
are different disorders, the public, including jurors, are often unable to ascertain the difference. 
See Bing, supra note 26, at 87 (“Jurors are unlikely to have a full grasp of mental retardation, 
including the difference between this condition and mental illness.”); see also Christopher 
Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENT. HEALTH & PHYS. DIS. L. REP. 667, 
667 n.16 (2000) (noting “the boundaries between [mental retardation and mental illness] are 
ill-defined and considerable overlap can exist”). 
224 Jamie M. Billotte, Note, Is it Justified? -  The Death Penalty and Mental Retardation, 8 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 333, 344 (1994) (quoting Upholding Law and Order, 
HARTSVILLE MESSENGER, June 24, 1987, at 5B).  Although this was stated pre-Atkins, a juror 
today with similar feelings could choose to ignore the “guilty but mentally retarded” verdict 
and vote for death out of feelings that the mentally retarded defendant, because of his or her 
retardation, may act out violently in the future. 
225 Bing, supra note 26, at 89 (“Jurors may deem the defendant’s retardation irrelevant if 
he is declared competent to stand trial.”). 
226 Burgess v. State, 450 S.E.2d 680, 695 (Ga. 1994). 
227 Bing, supra note 26, at 86; see also, Slobogin, supra note 205, at 1107 (“Capital 
sentencing juries…often treat mental disorder not as a mitigating circumstance (as the law 
requires) but as an aggravating circumstance supporting the imposition of the death penalty.”). 
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guidelines.228  Further, many jurors who believe a defendant to be mentally retarded 
have reported feeling sympathy or pity for the defendant.229  The more a juror 
reported feeling sympathy or pity for the defendant, the more likely the juror was to 
cast his or her vote at the start of deliberations for a life sentence.230  Most jurors 
relying on feelings of sympathy or pity to make their first vote usually stick with that 
vote.231  Thus, some jurors may obey statutory edict and, although they did not find 
the defendant “guilty but mentally retarded,” allow the defendant’s mental 
retardation as a mitigating factor to weigh in favor of a life sentence.232 
There are also protections available in the voir dire process for Georgia capital 
defendants alleging mental retardation.  Georgia permits the individual examination 
of jurors in capital cases.233  This examination may include questioning jurors on 
preexisting opinions of guilt or innocence toward the defendant and on prejudice or 
bias toward the defendant.234 Jurors who may be biased towards the defendant may 
be excused for cause.235 The trial court has authority to control the scope of voir dire, 
and can thus control the questioning to ensure prospective jurors will not be biased 
towards the alleged mentally retarded capital defendant.236  Although the court may 
exercise these safeguards by questioning jurors during voir dire, it is difficult to 
remove a juror for cause.  Indeed,  
a venireman cannot be excluded for cause unless he makes it 
unmistakably clear that (1) his attitude toward the death penalty would 
prevent him from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt, 
or that (2) he would automatically vote against the imposition of the death 
penalty in the case regardless of the evidence that might be developed at 
trial.237   
                                                                
228 Bowers, supra note 192, at 1073. 
229 Garvey, supra note 205, at 57. 
230 Id. at 62. 
231 Id. at 66. 
232 Although in Georgia the judge has discretion to determine the length of sentence during 
the sentencing phase, if the jury recommends a life sentence, the judge must abide by the 
jury’s decision.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (2005) (“Unless the jury trying the case 
makes a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance and recommends the death 
sentence in its verdict, the court shall not sentence the defendant to death.”) (emphasis added). 
233 GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-133 (2005). 
234 GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-164(a)(1)-(2) (2005). 
235 § 15-12-164(d); see also Fults v. State, 548 S.E.2d 315, 320 (Ga. 2001) (“A 
prospective juror who holds some opinion about the guilt of a criminal defendant need be 
excused only when it is shown that the opinion is so fixed and definite that the juror will be 
unable to set the opinion aside and decide the case based upon the evidence and the charge of 
the trial court.”). 
236 See Lawler v. State, 576 S.E.2d 841, 848 (Ga. 2003) (“The scope of voir dire is largely 
left to the trial court’s discretion, and it is not error for the trial court to exclude voir dire 
questions that do not deal directly with the juror’s responsibilities in the case.”). 
237 Redd v. State, 252 S.E.2d 383, 385 (Ga. 1979). 
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Given the certainty necessary to remove a juror for cause, it appears possible for 
a juror to harbor feelings of bias toward the mentally retarded that may not warrant 
his or her exclusion from the jury.  Thus, despite the safeguards available in the 
selection of a capital jury to protect against bias, it appears possible for some 
lingering bias to slip through and affect the juror’s decision.  Accordingly, the judge, 
who has training and experience to weigh and apply the law impartially,238 should 
make the determination on mental retardation. 
Notwithstanding the fact that some jurors may correctly weigh the defendant’s 
mental retardation, because some jurors will react to stereotypes about mental 
retardation and allow these stereotypes to bias their judgment, the judge, and not the 
jury, should make the mental retardation determination.  The risk that some jurors 
may be biased enough by their ignorance of mental retardation is sufficient to 
remove the retardation determination to the judge.  For all of the foregoing reasons, 
Ohio’s requirement that the judge make the mental retardation determination is more 
appropriate and results in a more consistent application of Atkins.   
VIII.  THE DIFFERENCES IN PROCEDURES LEAD TO AN ARBITRARY APPLICATION OF 
ATKINS 
The death penalty may not be applied under sentencing procedures that “create[] 
a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”239  
Because of Ohio’s and Georgia’s different procedures for determining mental 
retardation, there is a great risk that Atkins protections will be arbitrarily applied.240  
The procedural differences in Ohio and Georgia “increase the unpredictability with 
which Atkins is applied.”241  For example, as discussed above, a defendant may be 
successful in proving his or her mental retardation by a preponderance of the 
evidence, but he or she may be unable to prove his or her retardation beyond a 
reasonable doubt.242  Also, a Georgia juror may possess bias toward the alleged 
retarded defendant, and that bias may prevent a finding of retardation.243  In other 
words, a defendant in Ohio may be found mentally retarded but the same defendant 
in Georgia may not.  This is the essence of an arbitrary application of Atkins; “the 
availability of [Atkins] protections become a function of local law.”244   
                                                                
238 By statute, “[t]he oath of office of each judge of a court of record shall be to support 
the constitution of the United States and the constitution of this state, to administer justice 
without respect to persons, and faithfully and impartially to discharge and perform all the 
duties incumbent on him as such judge, according to the best of his ability and understanding.”  
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3.23 (2005). 
239 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).  
240 See Orpen, supra note 21, at 88 (arguing that the failure of the Supreme Court to set a 
uniform state standard for determining insanity and mental retardation leads to an arbitrary 
application of capital sentences, which “arguably violates Furman”). 
241 Id. at 91. 
242 See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra Part VII. 
244 Orpen, supra note 21, at 88. 
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss3/8
2006] INCONSISTENT METHODS 431 
A uniform national procedure and definition of mental retardation is necessary to 
ensure that Atkins is not applied arbitrarily.245  The Ohio procedure, as has been 
shown to best offer Atkins protections, should serve as a national legal procedure for 
determining mental retardation for Atkins purposes.  Because both the Ohio and 
Georgia definitions are substantively similar to the definitions offered by medical 
authorities, either could be used as the legal definition of mental retardation.  Using 
one of these definitions will ensure states determine mental retardation consistently. 
IX.  RECOMMENDED PROTECTIONS FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 
The mentally retarded are at an acute risk of wrongful sentencing, particularly 
because of bias and misunderstanding of their disorder.  Because the mentally 
retarded often attempt to hide their disability,246 attorneys may be genuinely unaware 
of a defendant’s mental retardation and may fail to raise the issue or to request much 
needed experts to prove the defendant’s claim.247  Also, the mentally retarded are 
susceptible to police coercion during interrogation.248  It is thus necessary that some 
training procedures be implemented to protect the rights of the mentally retarded.249 
Ohio and Georgia do not offer much training to police, judges, or attorneys.  In 
Ohio, the “Peace Officer Training Academy” (POTA) offers a variety of training 
classes for peace officers, including a class on “Dealing with the Mentally Ill in a 
Crisis.”250  This, however, appears to be the extent of Ohio training programs 
available to police officers; there is no mandatory training required for police 
officers to identify mentally retarded criminal offenders.  The Ohio Public 
Defender’s Office makes available on its website sample motions for attorneys 
representing mentally retarded defendants who may be sentenced to death.251  The 
office does not make available any training classes or programs for representing the 
mentally retarded.252  Likewise, Georgia, at its Public Defender’s Office website, 
offers some assistance to attorneys representing mentally impaired individuals and to 
family and friends of the mentally impaired.253   
                                                                
245 Id. at 91. 
246 See John Blume & David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to Death: An 
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REV. 725, 734 (1988) (stating that because mentally 
retarded persons are often able to mask their intellectual limitations, they are “often thought to 
be ‘stupid,’ ‘a little slow,’ ‘dumb,’ or ‘uncooperative’ rather than mentally retarded”). 
247 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1. 
248 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 152, at 428. 
249 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1 (recommending training programs for police, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges). 
250 Ohio Attorney Gen., POTA Online Course Catalog, http://www.ag.state.oh.us/ 
le/training/catalog/CourseCatalog.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2006).  Topics at this class include 
an introduction to mental and psychiatric illnesses and mental retardation.  Id. 
251 See Office of the Ohio Public Defender, Mental Retardation Motions, http://opd.ohio. 
gov/Mental/Mental_Claims_mainpage.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2006). 
252 See Id. 
253 See Debra J. Blum, GEORGIA PUBLIC DEFENDER STANDARDS COUNSEL, WHEN SOMEONE 
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IS ARRESTED IN GEORGIA (2003), http://www.gpdsc.com/omha-
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
432 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:405 
To protect the rights of mentally retarded defendants, Georgia and Ohio should 
offer mandatory training programs to death penalty attorneys and police officers.  
The mandatory training for death penalty attorneys would better enable them to 
communicate with their mentally retarded clients and assist in their defense.254  
Further, this training would enable attorneys to recognize mental retardation early on 
and challenge waivers of procedural rights that their client may have never 
understood.255  The mandatory training for police officers would better equip them to 
identify mental retardation and enable them to utilize this training when questioning 
mentally retarded defendants.256  This training will help protect the rights of mentally 
retarded individuals and ensure that their retardation is recognized early in the 
criminal process such that they are afforded all the protections granted by Atkins. 
X.  CONCLUSION 
Ohio’s procedure for determining mental retardation is superior to Georgia’s and 
should serve as the basis for a national mental retardation legal procedure.  Ohio and 
Georgia offer substantially similar definitions of mental retardation and either could 
be used as a national legal definition of mental retardation.  Ohio and Georgia have 
vastly different procedures for determining mental retardation.  Ohio’s procedure 
affords the best opportunity for the defendant to receive the protections of Atkins.  To 
prevent an arbitrary application of Atkins, it is important that Ohio’s procedure, and 
Ohio’s or Georgia’s definition, be adopted to serve as national legal standard for use 
in determining mental retardation. 
Ohio’s use of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard to prove mental 
retardation is a more appropriate standard of proof because it better meets the overall 
goal of Atkins.  There are great differences between requiring a defendant to show he 
or she is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence than requiring a 
defendant to show he or she is mentally retarded beyond a reasonable doubt.  A 
mentally retarded defendant’s low intellectual functioning suggests that requiring 
him or her to prove mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence is best 
suited to his or her unique needs.257  As shown above, it is clear that requiring 
                                                           
resources-handbook.pdf. Georgia Public Defender Standards Council, Mental Health 
Advocate: Seminar Calendar, http://www.gpdsc.com/omha-resources-seminars.htm (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2006) (listing OMHA Mental Health Seminar on May 19, 2005). 
254 Bing, supra note 26, at 84-86. 
255 Bing, supra note 26, at 82; see also State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 160 (N.C. 
1993) (holding that a finding of mental retardation in North Carolina is no bar to a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights where the defendant appeared to understand 
instructions and signed a waiver form, even though the defendant had an I.Q. score between 
61 and 69 and a mental age of 8 to 10 years); Livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748, 754 (Ga. 
1994) (finding valid a mentally retarded defendant’s confession because there was no police 
coercion). 
256 Bing, supra note 26, at 72 (noting that mentally retarded persons have “an increased 
susceptibility to the influence of authority figures”); see also Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 
152, at 428-29 (“Because few mentally retarded people are able to determine what information 
might have legal significance for their case, spontaneous memory and cursory questioning 
cannot reliably ascertain all the facts.”). 
257 See Bing, supra note 26, at 134-35; see also Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 152, at 428; 
Entzeroth, supra note 120, at 917. 
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mentally retarded capital defendants to prove mental retardation by a preponderance 
of the evidence will best meet the goal of Atkins by effectively ensuring that 
mentally retarded capital defendants do not face the death penalty.   
Ohio’s requirement that a judge determine mental retardation is more appropriate 
than Georgia’s requirement that a jury make such a determination because of the 
greater risk for jury bias.  Requiring the judge to make the retardation determination 
provides the greatest opportunity to minimize bias.  Thus, Ohio’s requirement that 
the judge determine mental retardation should be adopted into a national legal 
procedure for determining mental retardation.   
The definitions of mental retardation proffered by Ohio and Georgia mirror those 
offered by medical authorities.  Other state definitions of mental retardation are more 
complex in their language, and may create confusion in their application.258  Either 
Ohio or Georgia’s definition of mental retardation should be adopted to serve as the 
national legal standard for Atkins purposes because both reflect the modern medical 
world’s understanding of mental retardation.  Adopting either of these definitions 
will also help ensure that Atkins is applied consistently in all states implementing the 
death penalty. 
A uniform procedure and definition for Atkins claims is necessary to ensure that 
all retarded persons receive the protections of Atkins.  Absent a national standard, as 
Ohio’s and Georgia’s different procedures show, Atkins protections become a 
function of state law and vary depending on the jurisdiction in which one is tried.259  
A national standard is, therefore, necessary to ensure that Atkins is not arbitrarily 
applied.   
SCOTT R. POE* 
                                                                
258 See supra note 124 and accompanying text; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(1) 
(West 2005) (defining mental retardation); Raines, supra note 25, at 197-98 (arguing that the 
1983 definition of mental retardation, like that used by Florida, is difficult for laypersons to 
understand). 
259 Orpen, supra note 21, at 88. 
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